Fordham Law Review
Volume 8

Issue 2

Article 6

1939

Recent Decisions

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Recent Decisions, 8 Fordham L. Rev. 253 (1939).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol8/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
BILLS ANDrNOTES-REPERENCE ro EXTRLqSc CONTrAcTsr-The plaintiff sued the

drawer on a trade acceptance containing a due date, August 5, 1938, and a printed
stipulation beneath the signature of the drawer that "the obligation of the acceptor
hereof arises out of the purchase of goods from the drawer, maturity being in conformity with the original terms of purchase." The defendant pleaded breach of con-

tract and fraud. The plaintiff moved to strike out the defense as insufficient on the
ground that the personal defenses of breach of contract and fraud were not available
against a holder in due course and asked for judgment on the pleadings. Held, the
order was unconditional and negotiable; the plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the
pleadings. State Trading Corporation v. Smaldone, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 30, 1938, p.
1875, col. 3. (Special Term).
It is familiar learning that when a clause in a bill of exchange renders payment
conditional upon the terms of an exrinsic contract, and the instrument is nonnegotiable, the defenses of fraud in the treaty and breach of contract valid against
the payee, are available also against his transferee. But if such reference to a collateral document does not condition the terms of the bill, the instrument remains
negotiable and the stated defenses must fail as against a holder in due course.
By that section of the statute which defines negotiability, a bill must contain an
unconditional order to pay a sum certain in money.; A later section adds that "an
unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional ... though coupled with...
a statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument." 3 There has been
a welter of conflicting decisions interpreting the scope, extent and application of
these sections to bills and notes containing specific references to some extrinsic
agreement or contract between the drawer and the payee. Into this confusion of
authority one must plunge to determine whether in the present case the payment of
the draft is made subject to or conditional upon any extrinsic agreement.
A negotiable instrument has been termed "a courier without luggage." The
difficulty lies in distinguishing between luggage and mere identification tags. When
a reference by use of the words "subject to" makes the bill or note specifically contingent upon some extrinsic contract, the courts have been uniform in their agreement that the instrument is rendered non-negotiable.3 The words "as per contract"
1. Abrahamson v. Steele, 176 App. Div. 865, 163 N. Y. Supp. 827 (1st Dep't 1917).
2. N. Y. NEGoTIABLE INsusrm-Trs LAw, (1897) § 20 (2).
3. N. Y. Nmro=Br IsRu, mTs LAw, (1S97) § 22 (2).
4. Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 (1846).
5. Kots Throwing Co. v. Manufacturers Commercial Co., 179 Fed. 813 (C. C. A. 2d,
1910), (held non-negotiable a note "subject to terms of contract between maher and payee") ;
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Stumpel, 126 MJisc. 375, 213 N. Y. Supp. 536 (Sup. Ct. 1926),
aff'd, 247 N. Y. 533, 161 N. E. 173 (1928) held non-negotiable a note subject to the terms
of a conditional sales agreement which accelerated maturity of the note at any time
conditional seller deemed himself insecure. This reference to a collateral agreement not
only made the note conditional but also made uncertain the maturity date. (The cult
reached will be the same whether the reference is placed on the front or back of the
instrument). Verner v. White, 214 Ala. 550, 108 So. 369 (1926), ("subject to terms of
contract"); Wmzis'ro-, Nrco mLE INsmulrss (Rev. ed. 1933) 38; BiGErow, IV7 o
Bums, Nom.s ,mms CHcxs (3d ed. 1928) § 93 ("The courts have shown a dposition to
interpret this rule, . .. in a spirit of liberality, . . . save where the instrument indicates
on its face that it is made subject to the conditions or contingencies growing out of the
original transaction . . ."). See (1923) 23 COL. L. Rrv. 183 for acceptances "as Inr
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do not per se affect negotiability when coupled with and following the words "value
received," as payment is not construed to have been made conditional thereby.
Slight variations on the other hand, such as "rent for a month ... as per contract", 7
or "as per contract for certain apparatus," 8 have been held sufficient to make the
notes non-negotiable. The inference is fair in these cases that the mere use of such
words will not necessarily destroy the negotiable character of the instrument. Rather
the position of the words must be such as to indicate an intention to condition in
some way the obligation to pay. This is the test we must apply to the instant case.
The clause reading "the obligation of the acceptor hereof arises out of the purchase of goods from the drawer" has already received judicial interpretation in
New York. The court held that the words recited no more than a statement of the
transaction which gave rise to the instrument, 9 and that the negotiable nature of the
note was not affected thereby. The same words have received similar construction
in other jurisdictions,' 0 although at times based upon seemingly unsound methods of
reasoning."
However, the instant case presented in addition to the clause discussed, the added
phrase "maturity being in conformity with the original terms of purchase," and
thus confronted the New York court with a question of first impression. As one of
the purposes behind the negotiable instrument is uniformity, 12 the court examined
contract." Orange Grove State Bank v. Williams, 277 S. W. 773, 774 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923) (the result reached will be the game whether the reference is placed on the front
or back of the instrument). Gaines v. Fitzgibbons, 168 La. 260, 121 So. 763 (1929) (the
notes were "subject to the conditions set forth in the contract of sale with which this
note is identified").
6. First National Bank of Richmond, Indiana v. Badham, 86 S.C. 170, 68 S.E. 536
(1910), ("value received in one machine as per contract"); National Bank of Newbury v.
Wentworth, 218 Mass. 30, 105 N. E. 626 (1914), ("value received as per contract");
The Waterbury Wallace Co. v. Ivey, 99 Misc. 260, 163 N. Y. Supp. 719 (1st Dep't 1917);
Strand Amusement Co. v. Fox, 205 Ala. 183, 87 So. 332 (1921), ("value received with
interest as per contract"). Tyler v. Whitney v. Central Trust & Savings Bank, 157 La.
250, 102 So. 325 (1924),

("value to be received . . . as per lease this date").

7. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Times Pub. Co., 142 La. 209, 76 So. 612 (1917).
8. Central National Bank v. Hubbel, 258 Mass. 124, 154 N. E. 551 (1927).
9. Coopersmith v. Maunz, 227 App. Div. 119, 237 N. Y. Supp. 1 (4th Dep't 1929).
10. Bartoshesky v. Houston Trading Corp., 198 At. 697 (Del., 1938); Arrington v.
Mercantile Protective Bureau, 24 S. W. (2d) 383 (Tex. Com. App., 1930). This case,
by a refusal to follow the contrary former holdings, in effect, overrules Harris v. Wuensche,
7 S.W. (2d) 595 (Tex. App., 1928); Harris v. Bucek, 8 S.W. (2d) 565 (Tex. App. 1928)
which had held that the clause, "the obligation of the acceptor hereof arises out of the
purchase of goods from the drawer" rendered the note non-negotiable.
11. American Exchange National Bank v. Steeley, 10 S.W. (2d) 1038 (Tex. App., 1928).
The court stated that if the reference to the extrinsic contract reasonably conveyed tile
fact that it was an executed one, negotiability would not be affected. But, such a test of
reasonability is far too hazardous when applied to negotiable instruments. Negotiability
is a matter of freedom from conditions. Whether a condition is performed or not, if the
order is conditioned when issued, it does not fulfill the statute. The court in Tyler v.
Whitney 'Central Trust & Savings, Bank, 157 La. 250, 102 So. 325, (1924) pointed out
that "the fact that the consideration recited is executory will not change the rule (that
is make the note non-negotiable), unless it appears from the rental that payment is made
to depend on the performance or-the execution of the consideration recited."
' 12.

BPRANNAN'S NuonABL

INSTRUMaNTS LAW (6th ed. 1938) 98-103.
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cases in other jurisdictions. Four cases have dealt with the identical phrasing and
two have held that negotiability was impaired. 1 3 One by dicta has indicated that
negotiability is impaired 14 while one has considered the words of no effect.25
The two cases directly in point, proceed on the grounds that the instrument is
rendered payable on a contingency,O and that the clause is a limitation on the due
date,17 which renders it uncertain because reference must be had to the "original
terms of purchase" of another contract than the instrument itself. The court in the
instant case has rejected not only this reasoning, but also the precedent for uniformity which might have carried it along with the weight of authority on this
precise phraseology which stands against negotiability. Instead the court has followed the minority Minnesota ruling18 in which the words were regarded as merely
a statement of the transaction which gave rise to the instrument. The bill hence
was essentially different from an instrument where the reference made another underlying contract a part of itself and so became subject to its terms 1 o
If these words in the instant case are more than a recital of the transaction which
gave rise to the present agreement, can their presence be excused as being a superfluous phrase having no bearing on the contract of the parties? It must be borne in
mind that doubtful and unnecessary phrases, laxly permitted on litigated negotiable
13. First National Bank v. Power Equipment Co., 211 Iowa 153, 233 N. W. 103 (1930),
(construed the clause to be a limitation on the due date); Westlake Mercantile Finance
Corp. v. Merritt, 204 Cal. 673, 269 Pac. 620 (1928), (construed instrument to be payable
on a contingency).
14. Lane v. Crum, 291 S. NV. 1084 (Te-x. Com. App., 1927). The court justified its
holding that the note was non-negotiable by pointing out that the obligation of the
acceptor according to the terms of said clause, arose not from the instruments themsehves,
but from a collateral transaction. But the court would have ruled similarly bad there
been a use only of the first clause under discussion. Harris v. Wuen-che, 7 S. W. (2d)
595 (1928). A subsequent ruling in the same jurisdiction has held that the first claue
will not render a note non-negotiable. This holding renders nugatory the decision in
Lane v. Crum. The case is Arrington v. Merchant Protective Bureau, 24 S. W. (2d) 383,
384 (1930). The court significantly pointed out that the clause was a mere recital, that
the obligation disclosed by the instrument was one given for the purchase of goods from
the drawer by the acceptor), the case of Lane v. Crum has been commented on in
37 YArx L. J. 382. The author did not indicate any opinion as to the effect the second
clause might have had on the decision.
15. Heller v. Cuddy, 172 Minn. 126, 214 N. W. 924 (1927) the court distinguished the
situation herein from that presented in King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 Minn. 481, 199
N. W. 437 (1924) where it was found that the reference was of such a nature as to subject the paper to the terms of the enxtrinsic agreement and to impose terms upon it.
16. Westlake Mercantile Finance Corp. v. Merritt, 204 Cal. 673, 269 Pac. 620 (1928);
the case has been discussed briefly in (1928) 15 VA. L. Rrv. 170. See Br ,,'s NEcoTrix LNsraum-mrS LAW (6th ed. 1938) § 3. The argument is advanced that the clause
renders the note non-negotiable in the Westlake Mercantile Finance Corp. v. Merritt because the instrument contains no date of maturity. This fact, however, is not apparent
in the reported case. A fortiori, it seems to be denied by a question which the court
words on p. 60, to wit, "Particularly, does the expression (clause quoted) refer to the date
set up in the body of the trade acceptance, or does it refer to the underl ing contract
between the parties?"
17. First National Bank v. Power Equipment Co., 211 Iowa 153, 233 N. W. 103 £1930).
18. Heller v. Cuddy, 172 Minn. 126, 214 N. W. 924, 925 (1927).
19. For a brief discussion of the case, see (1927) 12 M1ni;:. L. REv. 68.
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instruments, can give rise to a dangerously uncertain condition, for the specific phrase.
ology construed to be the surplusage of one instrument, may by a slight manipulation
in position, be the weakening non-negotiating link in another. The burden of differentiation and distinction is a heavy one to thrust upon the layman. The test of the
soundness of the ruling must of course be contingent upon its practicability, for the
Negotiable Instrument Law deals with a practical subject. True, the courts have
deemed it good public business policy to stretch points in an effort to salvage nego.
tiability to instruments on the boundary line, 20 but the instant case seems questtionable.

CONFLICT OF LAws-ToRT.-The plaintiff, a resident of Florida, brought an action
in a federal district court for New York against the defendants, husband and wife
for an assault committed upon her in Florida by the wife. The defendants are citi.
zens of New York and the husband had never been in Florida. The common la i
still obtains in Florida, under which a husband is liable for the torts committed by
his wife. On appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint as against the husband
held, any liability in the husband can be created only by the law of New York, the
state in which the court is sitting, not by the law of Florida. Therefore, assuming
that the husband is liable in Florida, New York will not accept as a model for any
tort liability which it will create, a liability imposed by another state upon an absentee non-resident who did not procure, incite, or in any other way make himself
a party to the tort. Judgment affirmed. Siegmani v. Meyer, 100 F. (2d) 367 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1938).
The American courts, in explanation of the fact that they sometimes decide cases
according to the rules of law established by some state other than the forum, have
pronounced three theories of conflict of laws. 1 The earliest of these, which was advanced by Judge Story,2 declares that when the forum enforces a right in the plaintiff
arising from a transaction which took place in a foreign jurisdiction it does so as a
matter of "comity", or "courtesy".a This explanation was discovered to be inadequate by later writers,4 and was succeeded by the "vested rights" theory,5 which

20. OGDEN, NEGOTIABLE INSTR UM NTs (3d ed. 1931)
Sup. 273, 156 AtI. 740 (1931).

§ 70; Musser v. Fehr, 102 Pa.

1. The provisions of the Federal Constitution do not obviate a conflict of the laws
among the states, nor, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, with some exceptions, Impose
a duty upon the states to conform their decisions on conflict of laws to what the Supreme
Court regards as correct principles. DOnD, The Poorer of the Supreme Court to Review
State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, (1926) 39 HAv. L. REV. 533.
2. STORY, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) § 38; STumERO, CoNr er oF LAWS
(1937) 6.
3. STORY, 1oC. cit. supra, note 2.
4. DicLY, Coi cr or LAWS (Keith, 4th ed. 1927) 9; DoDD, op. cit. supra, note 1, at
536; Beach, Uniform Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 656. The editors
of Story have abandoned the theory. See STORY, CoNrsacr OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) § 36.
Criticism of the theory is threefold. First, the application of foreign law is not a matter
of caprice or option as it would seem to be under the comity theory. Second, it throws
no light, except negatively, on the question of when foreign law is adopted. Third, it has
led some courts to follow a policy of reciprocity, that is, to refuse to entertain suit
arising from transactions which take place in other states or countries on the sole ground
that the latter had refused to enforce a similar action brought by one of its own citizens.
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has been adopted by many courts. 0 Its proponents declare that a right is created
at the time, the place, and by the laws of the state where the wrong was committed.7
The right vests in the plaintiff,s while the act complained of gives rise "to an obligation, an obligatio, which like other obligations, follows the person (of the defendant'),
and may be enforced wherever the person may be found."0 Accordingly, when suit
is brought in a state other than the one where the transaction occurred, the courts
of the forum give effect, not the foreign law as such, but to the right created by
that law.' 0 Thus, in the application of this theory, the forum seeks an appropriate
jurisdiction by the laws of which it shall determine the existence of a right in the
plaintiff, rather than an appropriate rule of substantive law."
Critics of the theory allege that it does not fit the facts and offer a third explanation. They contend that both the right and the remedy are created by the laws
of the forum.' 2 Besides the questionable theoretical defect of the vested rights
theory, they also point out that there are practical factors which render its application in any particular case difficult. First, it presupposes an entire legal system defining the facts which give the state in which the right arises jurisdiction1 3 to create
such right enforceable in other states. Actually, the method of determining jurisdiction varies with the right sought to be enforced and the state allegedly creating the
right.' 4 Secondly, the proponents of the vested rights' theory maintain that a right
in the plaintiff should not be defeated by procedural bars extant in the state in
which the putative right arises. However, separating the procedural elements from
the substantive often becomes a matter of considerable difficulty. 1 5 Finally, there is
a large field of exception, since according to the theory the forum is not required to
enforce rights vested in a plaintiff where to do so would violate its settled public
policy' 6
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113 (1395); Union Securities Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 55, 236
Pac. 513 (1925).
5. BF-=, Co.,ucr or LAws (1916) § 73.
6. Slater v. Mexican Nat. Ry., 194 U. S. 120 (1904); Western Union TeL Co. v. Brown,
234 U. S. 542 (1914); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 193 (1913).
7. BEx, Coeazcr or LAws (1916) § 73; 2 BEALE, Co:,rucr or Lwvs (1935) § 378.2;
R.ESTATEm=ET, Coxnrcr Or LAws (1934) §§ 378-379.
8. BmaE, Co-mercr OF LAws (1916) 107.
9. Slater v. Mexican Nat. Ry., 194 U. S. 121, 126 (1904).
10. Bn.ux, Co.rucr or LAws (1916) 107; S= nm o, Co:,rcr or L.vws (1937) 3.
11. Cavers, A Critique of the Choke-of-Law Problem (1933) 47 H,%nv. L. RMv. 173,
178.
12. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 Y, L. J.
457, and Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws (1935) 35 COL. L. P . 202; Lorenzen,
Terr7itoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YA= L. J. 736, and Tort
Liability and the Conflict of Laws (1931) 47 Lw QuraR=Y REv. 483.
13. "'Jurisdiction' means the power of a state to create interests which under the
principles of the common law will be recognized as valid in other states.' RES,,Tri r,
Co-N cr or LAws (1934) § 42.
14. Stumberg, Foreign Created Rights (1930) 8 Tcmts L. REv. 173, 191; Srftimnca,
Conrier or LAws (1937) 9.
15. Cavers, op. clt. supra, note 11, at 185; Comment (1935) 4 ForDma= L. RI%. 89,
91; (1935) 44 YAr L. J.1233, 1234.
16. Hudson v. von Harnm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1927); G=Rucni Co.,.mcr
or LAws (2nd ed. 1938) § 8; 3 BrExx, Conrrmxcr or LAws (1935) § 612.1. However, it is
contended that such an e-xecption should not be permitted. Beach, Uniform Inicrsate
Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918) 27 Yar.x L. J. 656.
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In the instant case, as part of the ratio decidendi, Judge Learned Hand reiterates
the third theory of conflict of laws, which we may call the "local law" theory,17
saying: " . . . the liability enforced (by the forum) is the creature of its own will;
its law of conflict of laws alone determines when it will fashion a liability after the
foreign liability.' 8 As expanded by writers on the subject,' 0 this probably means
that the forum enforces its substantive law only. When the transaction leading to
the suit presently before it, contains foreign elements the court will take into consideration the law of the foreign state as one of the operative facts upon which the
rights created by their own law depend.20 Thus, in contrast to the vested rights
theory, according to which law is local and rights are transitory, by this new theory
rights are local and law is spatially unlimited. 21
It is evident that upon any theory the same decision would follow from the facts
of this case. Under the vested rights theory, in order that a right be created by the
laws of Florida, that state must have had jurisdiction 22 in order to obtain power to
create such right. This it did not have. 23 And similarly, under the comity theory
the forum would be under no duty of "courtesy" to enforce a right created by the
17. This name was first applied to the theory by Dodd, Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 533.
18. Siegmann v. Meyer, 100 F. (2d) 367 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
19. See note 12, supra.
20. Ibid.; STUMBERG, CoNFLicr oF LAws (1937) 13.
'21. deSloov~re, The Local Law Theory and Its Implications in the Conflict of Laws
(1928) 41 HARv. L. Rav. 421, 450.

22.

See note 13, supra.

REsTATEmENT, CONrLICr OF LAWs (1934) § 47. The lack of jurisdiction to impose
a liability upon this defendant would seem to follow inevitably from the basic principles
of the vested rights theory. The existence of liability for a tort is, it is true, governed by
the laws of the state in which the tort is committed [Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Bank,
127 Iowa 153, 161, 98 N. W. 918, 922 (1904) ; Ryan v. Scanlon, 117 Conn. 428, 168 Atl.
17 (1933)]. But the right which arises there in the plaintiff imposes a concurrent liability
only in the tort-feasor,--in this case, the wife. Consequently, in order that the absentee
non-resident defendant (in this case, the husband) may be made subject to the lex loci
delicti, it is necessary that he have submitted himself in some way to the authority of the
State (Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); RESTATE.tENT,

23.

Co.r.mcrs § 387, Comment a]. This most frequently arises under a master-servant relationship. [Laughlin v. Mich. Motor Lines, 276 Mich. 545, 268 N. W. 887 (1936); RrsTA'TrMENT, CoirrLicTs § 387, Comment b]. However, in recent years, the doctrine of vicarious
liability has been extended in two cases to persons who loaned their automobiles to others,
to be used in a foreign state, which foreign state by statute imposed liability upon the
owner of an automobile involved in an accident [Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253 (1933);
Scheer v. Rockne Motors, 68 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934)]. The present case, however, is easily distinguishable from those: (1) because the Young and Scheer decisions were
obviously motivated by the growing atmosphere of interstate cooperation in the control
of motor vehicles, there being no similar cooperation in the field of domestic relations,
and (2) because the automobile decisions are predicated on the fact that the defendants
permitted others to use their own cars and authorized those others to take the cars into
the foreign state. In this case, by the law of New York, the wife was free and independent
of control by her husband. He could not authorize her to go to a foreign state, since she
already had that authority by law. Hence, it is clear that the decision in this case is compatible, indeed, even necessary, under the vested rights theory.
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laws of Florida when the latter state did not have jurisdiction to create such right. 2
Further, it would appear to be against the public policy of New York to enforce
such a liability, which under either theory would be sufficient to sustain the decision
of this case.2
The theoretical basis of the law of conflict of laws is in serious dispute and there
is no agreement among the writers as to the fundamental concepts involved.20 It is,
therefore, unfortunate that Judge Hand sought fit to express the dictum herein contained. It was not required to justify the decision. It lays dorn among the cases
a third theory of conflict of laws for which he cites no judicial precedent=- and the
merits of which do not in theoretical demonstration overcome its defects.2 3 The only
result of the dictum is to obfuscate an already difficult and involve subject.
24. Since comity is based on the general principle that the laws of a state have no
extra-territorial power, but can operate only upon those who are within the state's jurisdiction [See SToRY, loc. cit. supra, note 2; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113 (1895}]. Therefore, in this case, the doctrine of comity could not give precedence to Florida's law, Vhen
the defendant had never entered Florida's jurisdiction.
25. N. Y. Do=s REL.. LAW § 57; Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y.466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597
(1936). The Judge of the District Court in granting the defendant's motion for summary
judgment based his opinion wholly on the ground that it would violate the public policy
of New York to enforce such a liability as is involved here. Siegmann v. Meyer, Circuit
Court Clerk's file no. 16117, Transcript of Record 21-22.
26. See Cook's criticisms of the vested rights theory, (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457; (1935)
35 CoL. L. Rav. 202, and de Sloov~re's criticism of the local law theory, (1921) 41 ILHnv.
L. REv. 421. The most recent law review writer on the subject, Stimson, W'ich Law
Shoud Govern? (1938) 24 "VA. L. Ray. 748, advances a fourth theory. The writer contends that the existence of an effective remedy is a condition precedent to the creation of
a right, and therefore "the applicable law is the law to -which the person alleged to be
under a duty was subject at the time of his conduct the legal effect of which is in que-tion."
He rejects the idea that the forum enforces a foreign-created right (vested rights theory),
but imposes strict limitations upon the exercise of discretion by the forum, in its choice
of law, which contravenes an essential hypothesis of the local law theory.
27. The only possible judicial support for the proposition is contained in dicta of two
other cases, both decided by Judge Hand. Guiness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769, 770 (S. D.
N. Y. 1923); The James McGee, 300 Fed. 93, 96 (S.D. N. Y. 1924).
28. The local law theory is so broad that in effect there is no restraint upon the power
of the courts of the forum to reach any desired result. The court is not constrained to
apply the rules of substantive law of the forum because the case before it involves a
foreign element and therefore does not fit within the precise set of facts necessary to bind
the court under the doctrine of stare decisis, as it would be bound if the case before it
involved a purely domestic transaction. The court is not constrained to apply the rules of
law of the foreign state, although it recognizes its persuasive power and influence, bccam-e
by hypothesis the court applies the substantive law of the state in which it sits. This
latitude given the court in arriving at its decision, first, enables a reconciliation of cass
which under any other theory would be irreconcilable, and secondly, pcrmits the court
to be guided in its decision by considerations of expediency and social justice.
On the other hand, the local law theory precludes the attainment of either certainty or
uniformity in conflict of laws. It gives an impetus to the individualization of cases and
tends to oppose stare dec.sis. It opposes deductive methods in the conflict of law-, and
thereby precludes any fair probability of predicting the outcome of any given case. Thus,
when presented with a transaction involving foreign elements an attorney would he at a
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQuAL PROTECTION-REFuSAL TO ADMIT NEGRO TO STATE

LAW ScHooL.-The School of Law of the State University of Missouri refused to
admit the petitioner, a negro citizen of the State, otherwise qualified, upon the sole
ground of his race. The policy of the State of Missouri in undergraduate education
provides for the segregation of white and colored students. The continuance of this
policy in graduate and professional studies was provided for by the legislature through
a statute arranging for the payment of negroes' tuition in the universities of adjacent
States for any courses not offered to negroes within the State. 1 In an action of
mandamus to compel the curators of the University to admit him, the petitioner's
alternative writ was quashed and a peremptory writ was denied by the trial court.
The State Supreme Court affirmed the decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States, held, two justices dissenting, that under the Fourteenth Amend.
ment2 to the Constitution, the equal protection of the laws demands that the State
provide negro students with opportunities for higher education within the State substantially equal to those afforded white students. State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U. S.337 (1938).
Although the safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment 8 have been invoked mor
often in behalf of corporate enterprises than in the protection of the rights of the
negro race, yet it must be borne in mind that this latter function was the moti.
vating force behind its adoption. 4 The instant decision falls into that relatively
smaller number of cases concerned with this difficult problem. The socio-political relationship of the white and colored races has been through all history an intricate
one. Contrary to a popular misconception prevalent in northern states, there is no
constitutional provision demanding that the two races be commingled for all purposes. In fact, an opposite viewpoint has become the settled law, permitting
segregation in several fields, with a decided accent on the field of public education.
The establishment of separate school systems furnishing elementary, secondary and
collegiate instruction has been held constitutional within the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment 6 where substantially equal advantages are offered to
each race. 7 But the problem has grown more complex when negroes have sought
loss to advise his client. Finally, it is unjust that selection of the forum should determine
the result of the litigation, since that empowers the party having control over the choice
to select the forum most favorable to him.
1. "Pending the full development of the Lincoln University (for negroes), the board of
curators shall have the authority to arrange for the attendance of negro residents of the
State of Missouri at the university of any adjacant State to take any course or to study
any subjects provided for at the State University of Missouri, and which are not taught at
the Lincoln University and to pay the reasonable tuition fees for such attendance; provided that whenever the hoard of curators deem it advisable they shall have the power to
open any necessary school or department." 2 Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) § 9622.
2. U. S. CONST. AmEND. XIV.
3. Ibid.

4. See Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71 (U. S.1873); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S.
366, 382 (1898); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 591 (1900). See Boudin, Truth and
Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment, (1938) 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 19, 27.
5. Even prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the doctrine of segregation of white and colored children in primary schools was set forth in Roberts v. City of
Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1850).
6.

U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV.

7. "In the circumstances that the races are separated in the public schools, there Is
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admission to graduate and professional schools in states where the establishment
of such separate institutions has been deemed impractical because of the small number of applicants.8 Thus, the nice question arose whether a state afforded or denied
the equal protection of its laws when it provided opportunities to one group of its
citizens within its borders and provided another group with substantially the same
opportunities outside its borders.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland left this precise question open when it treated
a similar fact situation in University of Maryland v. MAurray. There the Court expressly refrained from supplying the answer inasmuch as the case could have been
decided in favor of the negro on the ground of the inadequacy in number of the
extra-state scholarships offered to the negroes of that State. But the courts in the
principle case were afforded no such deus ez -machina. The lower court placed great
stress on the adequacy and substantial equality of the advantages offered to negroes
under the statute. 10 It distinguished the case before it from the Maryland case by
showing that while the state of Maryland had expressed no intention to provide within its borders for the legal education of negroes, the Missouri legislature had declared such an intention and was merely providing temporary extra-state accommodations pending the establishment of a law school at Lincoln University whenever
such action was deemed necessary or practical. 1
The majority of the highest court refused to consider the adequacy of the substituted arrangements and squarely faced what it considered the basic constitutional
question involved. It flatly declared that no state could discharge its duty of providing higher education for negroes equal to that afforded the white race by setting
up a fund for study, however adequate, outside the State. In arriving at its conclusion the majority carefully considered the acts of the legislature' 2 but showed that
the curators of the negro university would not have been forced to provide the petitioner with a legal education if he sought it at that institution, but in the exercise
of their discretion they could have elected to pay his way through some law school
in an adjacent state. This discretionary power, despite the conveniefce of the
facilities extended elsewhere, 13 is not sufficient to validate such discrimin-tion.14 It
certainly to be found no violation of the constitutional rights of the one race more than
of the other, and we see none of either, for each, though separated from the other, i to
be educated upon equal terms with that other, and both at the common public eWx-m2."
Ward v. Flood, 43 Cal. 36, 51, 17 Am. Rep. 405, 414 (1874) cited with approval in Pearson
v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936). Cf. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 73 (1927);
People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438 (1SS3).
3. (1936) 45 YrALE L. J. 1296, note 7.
9. 169 Md. 478, 182 AUt. 590 (1936).
10. State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 113 S. W. (2d) 783 (Mo. 1937).
11. Id. at 791.
12. "The board of curators of the Lincoln University (for negroes) shall be authorized
and required to reorganize said institution so that it shall afford to the negro people of
the state opportunity for training up to the standard furnished at the state university of
Missouri whenever necessary and practicable in their opinion." 2 Mo. Rm,. Sr,%. (1929)
§ 9618.
13. Convenience does not seem to be a controlling factor in such cases. For in Lehew
v. Brummel, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765 (1891) the fact that petitioner's children were
forced to travel three and one-half miles to reach a colored school, although no white
child had to go farther than two miles, was held to furnish no substantial ground of
complaint. "Equality and not identity of privileges and rights is what is guaranteed to
the citizen." People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 455 (1883). But see Williams v. Board
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was to guarantee that no person or class of persons should be denied the protection
of state laws enjoyed by other persons of the same state that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted. 15
While equality was always the basic foundation of American democracy, its
citizens were never given constitutional insurance against unjust discrimination until
the advent of this Amendment.' 6 Hitherto in its application to the negro problem
the courts have uniformly avoided treating it as a social panacea and have merely
held that where a state offered advantages to its white citizens it must also offer
similar opportunities to its colored citizens,' 1 despite the fact that the negro demand
for such opportunities might be negligible.' 8 This decision and others similar to it
seem to indicate a trend in the Supreme Court away from its former attitude of
leaving to the discretion of the states the regulation of provisions affecting the
rights of its colored citizens. 19
of Education, 79 Kan. 202, 99 Pac. 216 (1908) wherein a failure to provide equal protection was held because the school authorities ordered a change in school sites forcing negro
children to travel one and one-half miles crossing sixteen railroad tracks.
14.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).

U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673 (1895). Cf. Missouri
v. Lewis, 101 U. S.22 (1879).
16. "The toleration of slavery undoubtedly prevented the insertion (in the Federal
15.

Constitution)

of any reference to equality or liberty."

GUTrimm,

Tna FouRTm

Ti

106 (1898). However it is to
be borne in mind that this guarantee as interpreted by the Courts applies only as a
limitation in the powers of the States, not upon the National Government. BuVxeIK, Tim
LAw OF THE AmEuCsoN CONsTITunTON (1922) 190.
17. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927). "Shortly stated, the requirement is not
that all persons shall be treated exactly alike, but that where a distinction is made there
shall be a reasonable ground therefore ...one based on administrative or political necessity, or convenience, or on economic needs. 2 WILOUGHBY, CoNsTITUnONAL LAW (1910)
§ 480.
18. McCabe v. Santa Fe R. R., 235 U. S. 151 (1914). Here the court in considering
the problem of providing sleeping accommodations for negroes on railroad cars held that
the limited demand for such facilities afforded no grounds for objection since the constitutional right not to be discriminated against is a personal one and does not depend on the
number of persons who may be discriminated against. This language was adopted in the
case of In re Oregon Tunnel, 120 Ore. 594, 253 Pac. 1 '(1927). However in Mitchell v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 229 I. C. C. 703 (1938) the Commission refused to follow the
McCabe case in construing the application of an Arkansas segregation statute to a similar
sleeping car situation. "In any event, we are not considering a constitutional question,
but rather questions of the Act. Volume of traffic is an important consideration in determining whether certain services demanded are warranted and whether a difference In
treatment is justified." Id. at 703. This decision seems to be directly contra to the Commission's earlier holding on the same question in Edwards v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.
Co., 12 I. C. C. 247 (1907). At that time the fundamental governing principle was "that
carriers must serve equally well all passengers, whether white or colored, paying the same
fare. Failure to do this is discrimination and subjects the passenger to 'undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage.'" Id. at 249. (Italics inserted.)
19. Louisiana v. Pierre, 83 L. Ed. 540 (1939). For a discussion of this decision and
other cases illustrating this recent ascendancy of negro rights see COMMENT (1939) 52 Hv.
L. REv. 823.
AmENDMENT

TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATEs
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The dissenting justices, finding no clear and unmistakeable disregard of constitutional rights sufficient to justify Federal intervention, thought the state's right of
selecting its own method of providing for public education should not be interfered with too readily.20 And this position seems a fair one. V"'hile it may be true
that the accommodations offered to the negro petitioner are not exactly the same as
those given white students within the State of Mfissouri, 21 yet it might easily be that
the Legislature has adopted the most suitable means of solving a difficult problem.!
It is submitted that the majority of the court in the instant case has treated the
problem as though it had arisen in the Colonial era rather than in modem times.
Their decision is rooted deeply in a view of the Union as a collection of strange countries. It seems concerned with some mythical impregnability of state borders. In
these days of facility of locomotion no valid objection lies against distances to be
traveled merely because a state border line must be crossed. For the past century,
many a white student has elected to leave the state of his residence and seek legal
education in another state. If he must travel to get to school what substantial
difference could the direction of his travel make to any negro seeking a legal education in good faith? If the opportunity for an education outside the state is made
possible-by the state, why is its duty not performed?

COPYRIGHT INFR GEMENT-Aw,,ARD oF DAMIAGES AND FRorTs.-In a previous
proceeding in the instant case, it was decided that defendants' motion picture "Letty
Lynton" plagiarized the plaintiffs' play "Dishonored Lady".' The present hearing is
on exceptions to the referee's report which awarded to the plaintiffs all the profits
earned by defendants' motion picture. It is argued by defendants that the play alone
did not earn all the profits made by the picture but that much of the profits were
due to the earnings of the actors; and that, therefore, plaintiffs should recover only
part of those profits. Held, in a case of this type, no apportionment can be made

20. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 85 (1927). A realistic view of a similar
situation was taken by the court in Cummings v. Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528 (1899)
when it refused to hold a denial of equal protection where a county board, while maintaining a high school for white children, did not maintain one also for colored children
because the available funds were insufficient. The court refused to grant the negro petitioner's request to close the white high school as it failed to see how the colored children
could be benefited in their education by depriving others of educational opportunity.
21. The decision of the Missouri court gives a more detailed account of the substantially identical nature of the courses offered in the four schools nearest to the petitioner
and elicits the interesting fact that the white residents in some parts of Missouri travel
further to reach Missouri's own law school than the petitioner would have to travel from
his home to a university in either of four adjacent states. State v. Canada, 113 S. W.
(2d) 783, 789 (1937).
See also note 12, supra.
22. "In the nature of things there must be many social distinctions and privilege3
remaining unregulated by law and left within the control of the individual citizem,
as being beyond the reach of the legislative functions of government to organize and
control. The attempt to enforce social intimacy and intercourse between the races, by
legal enactments, would probably tend only to embitter the prejudices, if any such there
are, which exist between them, and produce an evil instead of a good result." People v.
Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 448 (1833); cf. Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cuh. 198 (Mlasz.
IS50).
1. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
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and plaintiffs are entitled to recover all the profits of the production. Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., - F. Supp. - (S. D. N. Y., 1938).
The statutory right of a composer, author or artist to protection of his published 2
works has existed since the Middle Ages.3 The purpose of the copyright is to assure
to its owner the benefits of original 4 creative work, by prohibiting the infringement
thereof. Congress has passed copyright laws from time to time by virtue of its
power to "promote the progress of ... the useful arts, by securing for limited times
to authors . . . the exclusive right to their respective writings. . . . " These acts
effect their purpose by providing two remedies against infringement: (1) injunction;
(2) the recovery of damages and profits earned by the infringer.0
Thus, the owner of a copyright whose work has been infringed upon is entitled to
recover any damages he may have suffered, and all the profits earned by the in.
fringer by the use of the copyrighted material. 7 The rule works out justly enough
where the profits are all directly traceable to infringement of the copyright. There
are cases like the instant case, however, where it is obvious that the infringement
contributed only in part to the profits realized. Then it becomes unfair to apply the
settled rule8 that although plaintiff's work contributed only in part to the profits
earned, the owner of the copyright is entitled to all the profits where the amount
cannot be apportioned.
In the instant case, the defendants introduced evidence of experts to show that
much of the profits were realized because the stars (Joan Crawford and Robert
Montgomery) were important box office attractions. Perhaps this might be considered evidence upon which the court might have based an apportionment of profits;
but in a prior case involving the infringement of a story by the production of a play,
an apportionment between what was contributed by the play and what was supplied
by the actors, producer, etc., was declared impossible as a matter of law. 0 The
present court while expressing disapproval of that rule, was bound thereby to refuse
an apportionment in the instant case.
The recovery of all the profits in the instant case is considered unjust by the
2. At common law, a copyright exists, but is limited to unpublished works. Upon publication, the author's exclusive right is terminated. See, Caliga v. Interocean Newspaper
Co., 215 U. S. 182, 188 (1909).
3.

2 KENr Comm. *374 N.

One of the earliest instances of a copyright Is that Issued

by the Venetian Senate in 1469.
4. There can be no copyright of that which is in the public domain, e.g. copyright of
matter of which the copyright has expired. 17 U. S. C. A. § 7 (1909).
5. U. S. CoNsT. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
6. 37 STAT. 489, 17 U. S. C. A. § 25 (1909).
7. 37 STAT. 489 (1912), 17 U. S. C. A. § 25(b). In this respect copyrights differ from
patents where the patentee must elect between a suit for damages and an accounting for
the profits. Sebring Pottery Co. v. Steubenville Pottery, 9 F. Supp. 384 (N. D. Ohio 1934).
8. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617 (1888) (law reports infringing on headnotes);
Belford v. Scribner, 144 U. S. 488 (1892) (infringement of cook-book recipes). The theory
of these cases is derived from the law of the confusion of goods, that where one has caused
property to be mixed so that its identity is lost, he must lose all his own property as well.
Cf. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F. (2d) 1, 18 (1933) where the court expressed
disapproval of this rule. See also, the dissent of Judge McCormick, in the same case at
p. 45, where he argues that the wording of the present law would allow equity courts to

exercise discretion in awarding damages and profits.
9.

Dam v. Kirk La Shelle, 175 Fed. 902 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910).

point, see (1939) 52 HARv. L. Rzv. 688.

For a discussion of this
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court.10 Prior to the infringement, the author had contracted for a sale of the play
at $30,000, in negotiations which failed because the Hays office disapproved the
play. While it is true that the value put upon such a right in incompleted negotiations is immaterial,"' that sum is an indication of the disproportionate nature of the
amount awarded. But the theory of the present copyright law is that plaintiff should
be allowed what the infringer earned; not what the copyright ovnaer would have
earned if he had exploited the copyright himself.' 2 If a means of apportionment is
impossible, the outcome must be as the present court decided it under the existing
law.
It was urged in this case that the court apply another provision of § 25 that the
plaintiff recover "in lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the
court shall appear to be just.. . " (within limits of $250 and $5000).13 To accede
to this request would have raised two difficulties, however. The first arises from
the prior holding of the courts that the clause can be applied only where no actual
damages or profits can be shown.14 This rule was formulated because of a desire
to help the complainant who cannot show that he has suffered any damages or that
there has been any profit by allowing him to recover a statutory amount. 15 Another
aim of the rule is to prevent a complainant, who could show damages and profits,
from getting more than the infringer earned from the wrong.' 0 There is a second
difficulty: If the court does exercise the discretion granted by § 25b, its award is
limited to the provided statutory damages and may not go beyond them. 17 Thus,
the highest award possible is $5000. It is obvious that the application of the rule
would not fit this case where a just apportionment of the profits would necessitate a
higher award.
That some principle must be evolved to meet a situation like that present in the
instant case is obvious. The theory of the new copyright law does not seem to be
10. Cf. Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379, 53 Am. Dec. 307 (1850), stating the doctrine that a wrongdoer who enhances the value of goods loses to the rightful owner what
he (the wrongdoer) has contributed.
It may be noted that the parties negotiated with reference to the play in suit in 1930
at the time when the case of Nicholls v. Universal Picturez Corp., 45 F. (2d) 119 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1930), was handed down and which held that the play, Abie's Irizh RoQe, was not
plagia rized by the motion picture, The Cohens and The Kelley-, on the ground that their
similarity was merely in ideas which are not subject to copyright. It may be argued that
such a decision might be interpreted, by companies haling difficulties in negotiations for
stories and plays, as a liberal rule which would allow them to copy with safety. The
most effective way of putting a stop to such practices would be a judgment of the type
awarded here.
11. Doll v. Libin, 17 F. Supp. 546 (Montana, 1936).
12. Scribner v. Clark, 50 Fed. 473, 475 (N. D. IMl.1888). See (1934) 9 TrzsXe
L. Q.
78, 85 and cases cited.
13. 37 STAT. 489 (1912), 17 U. S. C. A. § 25(b). See note 21 infra.
14. Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U. S. 207 (1935); Davilla v. Brunwrick-Balke Collender Co., 94 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
15. See Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U. S. 207, 209 (1935) ...
The phraseology [of
§ 25(b)] was adopted to avoid the strictness of construction' incident to a law impozing
penalties, and to give the owner of a copyright some recompense for the injury done him,
in a case where the rules of law render difficult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of profits. In this respect the old law was unsatisfactory."
16. Da.villa v. Brunswick-Balke Collender Co., 94 F. (2d) 567, 56S (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
17. Westerman Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U. S. 100 (1919).
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the imposition of a penalty on the defendant, 18 but to give plaintiff reimbursement
for the loss he suffered by reason of the interference with his exclusive right to his
work. It is difficult to see, however, how an award which is out of proportion to
what would reasonably be plaintiff's loss, can be considered anything less than a
penalty.
The court, in this case, outlines its suggestions for a modification of the rule in its
application to cases where the copyright contributed to only a part of the profits
realized by the production which infringed upon it. One of these suggestions is an
application of the method used in patent cases where evidence is allowed upon which
the court can base an atard of reasonable royalty.' 9 If the law as it stands, despite
the analogy between patent and copyright infringement cases, is too rigid to allow
of any distinction, then legislation should be enacted to give the courts discretion
such as they have been granted by statute in patent infringement cases. 2 0 Certainly
a rule which leaves judges no alternative 2 t but to come to a decision against conscience is hardly worthy of survival.

INFANTS-TORTS BETWEEN MINORS IN DOAsESTIc RELATIONS.-The plaintiff, an

unemancipated minor, was seriously
also an unemancipated minor. Action
guardian. On appeal from judgment
emancipated minor may maintain an

injured through the negligence of his sister,
was brought against the sister by the plaintiff's
for plaintiff, held, judgment affirmed. An unaction against his unemancipated minor sister

18. Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148, 154 (1899); Bolles v. Outing Co., 175 U. S. 262
(1899). These cases were decided prior to the enactment of the present Copyright Act; but
they made a clear distinction between actions for damages and actions for statutory penalties. The present act, repealing the old provisions for penalties, makes no such provisions
except for the penalties included in the "in lieu" clause [37 STAT. 489 (1912)], 17 U. S.
C. A. § 25(b). In regard to this clause, the law expressly states that these damages "shall
not be regarded as a penalty." See also Davilla v. Brunswick-Balke Collender Co., 94 F.
(2d) 567, 570 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
It may also be noted that there is criminal liability for willful infringement for profit
(35 STAT. 1082, 17 U. S. C. A. § 28 (1909)) and intent is a necessary element of the misdemeanor. Liability for damages, however, is not affected by the innocence of intent.
Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145 (S.D. N. Y. 1924).
19. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U. S. 641 (1915).
20. 42 STAT. 392, 35 U. S. C. A. § 70 (1922).
21. It is difficult to agree with the note appearing in (1939) 52 HAuv. L REy. 688, which
seems to indicate that the judge in the instant case might have come to a different conclusion within permitted techniques. The contention is made that the court could have
made an apportionment of the profits on the evidence before it and again that the
decisions on which this case is based were decided prior to the enactment of the present
Copyright Act.
This district court nowhere indicated that it was bound by the case of Callaghan v.
Myers, 128 U. S. 617 (1888) except for the proposition that the report of the Special
Master is to be treated as presumptively correct. The district court, however, did base
its decision on the case of Dam v. Kirk La Shelle, 175 Fed. 903 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910) which
declared an apportionment impossible as a matter of law in a situation almost precisely
the same as that in the instant case, and the court here is bound by that decision.
It has been indicated that the existing interpretation of § 25(b) would not allow the
assumption of judicial discretion in the apportionment of profits.
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for personal injuries. Rozell v. Rozell, 256 App. Div. 61, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 901 (3rd
Dep't 1939).

The instant case is without precedent in this jurisdiction.' However. the court
decided that, on principle and analogy, the action was maintainable. The opinion
stated that there was no rule of sound public policy in this state which would prohibit the maintenance of this suit.2 In fact, said the court, "not only is the maintenance of such a suit not expressly or impliedly forbidden, but its prosecution is not
contrary to a well defined legislative policy." 3 The legislation referred to here was
the amended § 57 of the Domestic Relations Law, which gave to the husband or the
wife a right of action against the other for wrongful or tortious acts resulting in any
injury to the person. 4 The tribunal, in the instant case, construed that statute as
declarative of a policy likewise applicable to the brother-sister relationship.
The court evidently thought that the common law's aversion to actions which
tended to disintegrate the domestic unit was being broken down. Since actions between spouses for injuries resulting from tortious conduct were no longer denied,
why may not brother sue brother or sister?
It was reasoned at common law that a marriage created a legal unit as far as
husband and wife were concerned. 5 Therefore, the maintenance of any action
between the spouses would be inconsistent with the integration, by the law, of these
parties as a unit.6 The belief also prevailed that if such suits were not prohibited,
discord rather than peace would pervade the home. 7 At present, the conception of
unity, and the fears of a disruption of domestic tranquillity, if such suits were
allowed, seem to have abated. The change in the trend of the law is a striking one.
The instant case also presents the same question. However, it is well to remember
1. Rozell v. Rozell, 256 App. Div. 61, 63, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 901, 904 (3d Dep't 1939).
2. Ibid. "The courts have generally approved the statement that public policy is that
principle of the law which holds that no one can lawfully do that w hich has a tendency
to be injurious to the public or against the public good." Cahill v. Gilman, $4 Mise. 372,
377, 146 N. Y. Supp. 224, 227 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Spead v. Tomlinzon, 73 N. H. 46. 59 At.
376 (1904).
3. Rozell v. Rozell, 256 App. Div. 61, 63, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 901, 904 (3d Dzp't 1939).
4. N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 669, § 1, amendment to N. Y. Dom. RrL.. Lw (1909) § 57, providing for reciprocal rights of action for personal injuries to one spouse, caused by the
tortious conduct of the other. See (1937) 6 Fonmm%.n L. REv. 493; cf. Naote (1935) 4
Fomaazm L. REv. 475, 484 (suggesting statutory abolition of the concept of the unity
of the spouses, so as to authorize suits between husband and wife for personal injuries).
5. 1 BL. CoMMa. *444; ScuoIuER, DomsxEc REr-,TioNs (5th ed. 1895) § 51; Phillips v.
Barnet [1876] 1 Q. B. 436; Rex v. Harrison, 1 Leach 47, 168 Eng. Reprints 126 (1756);
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations (1930) 43 HLnv. L. R v. 1030,
1035.
6. "The reason why the wife cannot sue the husband for beating her must be bz-cau2
they are one and the same person, and the same reason exists in criminal law, ,here a
woman cannot be convicted of larceny though she has in fact carried away her husband's
goods. ...
The reason is not the technical one of parties, but because, being one person,
one cannot sue the other." Phillips v. Barnet, [1876] 1 Q. B. 436, 439.
7. "It is contrary to the policy of the law and destructive of that conjugal union and
tranquility, which it has always been the object of the law to guard and protect." Such
actions "might involve the husband and wife in perpetual controversies and litigation . . .
and sow the seeds of perpetual domestic discord." Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb.
366, 368, 369 (N. Y. 1863); Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 (N. Y. 186-5).
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that it required an express enactment of the legislature for spouses to maintain tortious actions against each other. The Married Women's Acts O uniformly gave to
women the right to own property, contract, and sue and be sued, as if unmarried.
Under these statutes, it was argued that the spouses could sue each other in tort,
But though the decisions were in conflict, the majority of the jurisdictions adhered
strictly to the common law rule, and steadfastly refused to sanction tort actions
between the spouses, unless some express legislative provi-ion were enacted.10 Therefore, it seems in point to question the soundness of the instant decision on that
issue. If it required a definite legislative enactment to provide for such suits, why
should not the courts likewise deny suits between minors in the same household,
until the state deems it a wise and sound policy to sanction their maintenance?
It is true that, historically, the prohibition of action never applied to brothers
and sisters in the same way in which, at early common law, it was applied to the
spouses. No vows are taken by the issue of any marriage that they are one until
death parts them. However, the policy of the courts at common law has ever
been to protect the domestic unit as a unit; not regarding it as separable into distinct
groups, such as the husband-wife, or parent-child, or brother-sister relationship, with
different principles applicable to each. Therefore, when considering the different
members of the domestic relation, perhaps it is possible that the same principle
must have been intended to apply to each. True, the legislature has taken much of
the sting out of the public policy argument by providing for suits between husbands
and wives, but it will be noted that, as concerns the parent-child relationship, no one
has yet suggested that suits, for tortious conduct may be maintained between parent
and unemancipated child."1
In further support of its position, the court points out that the owner of the
vehicle in which both the plaintiff and defendant were riding carried liability insurance. This, said the court, was a practical guaranty that the domestic tranquillity
would not be threatened by such suits.12 The same point was made in Dunlap v.
Dunlap,13 wherein a minor child was suing his father for negligent operation of his
automobile. The parent carried liability insurance. The court allowed a recovery in
that case, drawing a distinction between cases in which the parent was insured and
those in which he was uninsured. The court ably argued that since the recovery
truly was against the insurance company, there was no fear of the home being
broken up. Speaking of the parent, the court said, ".... he is not found to take the
8. See note 4, supra.
9. For complete discussion see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations,
(1930) 43 Hanv. L. REv. 1030, 1036.
10. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S.611 (1910); Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103
Pac. 219 (1909) ; Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 AtI. 534 (1927) ; Schultz v.
Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644 (1882); Pearlman v. Bklyn. City Ry., 117 Misc. 353, 191 N. Y.
Supp. 891 (Sup. Ct. 1921); (1913) 22 YALz L. J. 250. Contra: Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn,
42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4, 95 Aft. 657 (1915).
11. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248
N. Y. 626, 162 N. E. 551 (1928); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905) (holding father not civilly liable for ravishing his daughter). See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84
N. H. 352, 150 At. 905 (1930) (where recovery allowed child, suing father covered by
liability insurance) and Notes (1930) 10 B. U. L. R v. 584; (1930) 44 HAuv. L. Rnv. 135.
However, a parent was allowed an action against an unemancipated child in tort. Crosby
V. Crosby, 230 App. Div. 651, 246 N. Y. Supp. 384 (3d Dep't 1930).
12. Rozell v. Rozell, 256 App. Div. 61, 63, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 901, 904 (1939).
13. 84 N. H. 352, 364, 150 At]. 905, 912 (1930).
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. .It is more likely to be viewed as something to be welcomed,
4
as adding to the family assets."'
Herein lies a danger of which the legislature has taken cognizance. It was notorious
that insurance carriers had been defrauded in too many instances. The legislature
was well aware of the existing situation. It was the fear of affording further devices
for collusion that hindered the passage of the amendment to § 57 of the Domestic
Relations Law. When § 57 was passed, the legislature threw a protective cloal:
about the shoulders of the insurance carriers, by also amending the Insurance Lay,1'
and the Vehicle and Traffic Act.'0 But, the court in the instant case, while leaning
heavily for support on the amended § 57 of the Domestic Relations Law, as tending
to show the legislative policy, fails to consider the protective additions to the Insurance and the Vehicle and Traffic Laws which formed a part of the original session
law. 17 It does not mention the possibilities of collusion between brother and sister,
and that such possibilities might be as great as exist between husband and wife, and
parent and child. It fails to note that special legislative enactments were deemed
necessary to protect the insurers against these frauds. Therefore, until the necessary
legislative steps are taken, the soundness of the courts' position may well be questioned; for, admitting that such suits are not disruptive of the family unit, since
it is the insurer who pays, is it not equally against public policy to foster the possibility of additional frauds, by permitting the maintenance of such suits?
However, with the enactment of specific legislation on the subject, affording ample
protection against frauds, it will be found that the result in the instant case would
not be repugnant to good morals or natural justice. Everyone has a right to have
his person protected from injury. Having established this valuable right, and having
proved an injury to this right, with consequent damages, the legislature should provide some mode of redress, which, though not contravening the policy of the state,
vill make complete reparation.

situation seriously. .

JUDGMENTS-STATUTE Or LmxrrATioNs oN INTEREST.-Appellants intestate was
awarded $58,152 for land taken in an assessment proceeding. With benefits deducted, the net judgment entered in February, 1926, amounted to $54,554. This
amount was paid in October, 1926. In December, 1934, an action was brought to
recover interest upon the judgment entered. The trial court entered judgment for

the amount of the interest, which was reversed in a higher court. Upon appeal it
was held, two judges dissenting, that interest upon the sum of a judgment is authorized by statute alone. It is not such a part of the judgment as to come within
the scope of the statute of limitations applicable to judgments, but is rather within
the scope of the statute limiting, generally, actions not otherwise specifically pro14. See id. at 365, 150 Atl., at 913; cf. Aesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 At.
753 (1929).
15. N. Y. Laws of 1937, c. 669 § 2, adding subdivision 3a to § 109 of the N. Y. L;su-

.- cE LAw, providing that policies issued before and after the amendment to § 57 N. Y.
Domen REL. LAw, should not be deemed to insure against any liability of the insurcd for
injuries to his or her spouse unless express provision is made for such coverage in the
policy.
16. N. Y. Laws of 1937, c. 669 § 2, amending § 59 N. Y. Vnmc= &,.E Tmrric Lw%:.

Thus, it appears that the legislature was not willing to extend the tort liability to the
husband-wife relation without curbing the danger of collusion.
17. N. Y. Laws of 1937, c. 669, §§ 2, 3.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 8

vided for. Judgment affirmed. Blakeslee's Storage Warehouses, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill. 480, 17 N. E. (2d) 1 (1938).
In situations arising out of the non-payment of interest on judgments such as the
present case, an historical viewpoint is not without profit, in seeking an explanation
of the confusion which so often characterizes the courts' attitude towards this
question. In medieval society, predominantly agricultural as it was, most loans were
non-productive and the taking of interest upon any sort of debt was regarded as
usury-a sin in the eyes of the Church and a crime in those of the early common
law courts.' With the growth of commerce in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, the common law courts began to adopt in large measure
the body of the Law Merchant and to relax the strict medieval laws regarding usury. 2
However, the process was gradual and in the early American decisions we find that
the various state courts were not in accord as to whether interest was recoverable
upon a judgment at common law. 3 Today most, if not all, common law jurisdictions
provide for interest on judgments by statute.4
In numerous, more modem, decisions, the courts have defined interest as damages
for the detention of money due and consideration paid for the use of money.5 The
rationale of these cases is that, since the creditor is deprived of the productive use
of his money, the debtor must compensate him for that loss. In actions brought upon
a prior judgment, the judgment itself is the obligation which bears the interest and
not any transaction which gave rise to the judgment.0 In the light of this the court
1. LEEr JUaISDICTIoN or NORWICH (Vol. V, Selden Society, 1891) pp. 35, 38.
2. See 8 HOLDSWORTHS'S HISTORY OF THYt:
ENaus;s
LAW 100, for a discussion of the
effect of the Law Merchant on the English usury laws.
3. For cases holding that interest was recoverable at common law see: Crawford v.
Simonton's Ex'rs., 7 Port. 110 (Ala. 1838); Guthrie v. Wickliffe, 7 Ky. 541, 7 Am. Dec.
746 (1817); Fitzgerald v. Caldwell's Ex'rs., 4 Dall. 251 (Pa. 1802). For the contrary
proposition see: Thompson v. Monrow, 2 Cal. 99, 56 Am. Dec. 318 (1852); Frazer v.
Boss, 66 Ind. 1 (1879); Williamson v. Broughton, 4 McCord 212 (S. C. 1827).
On this question even the text writers are in conflict. "At common law, judgments did
not bear interest, and in an action on a judgment interest was recoverable (if at all) only
by way of damages." 2 BLACK, JUDOmENTS (2d ed. 1902) 1439, § 981. Another authority
holds that at common law interest could be collected on execution, but that the debtor
could satisfy the original judgment at any time by paying the amount thereof without
interest. If an action were brought upon the original judgment, damages were allowed
which some cases characterized as interest, others as damages. 2 FREEIAN, JVtIDoENTS
(5th ed. 1925) 2262.
4.
United States, 5 STAT. 518, 28 U. S. C. A. § 811 (1842); with regard to claims
against the United States, 43 STAT. 940, 28 U. S. C. A. § 765 (1925); and 43 STAT. 939,
31 U. S. C. A. § 226 (1925); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5781; California,
CAL. GEN. STAT. tit. 276 § 1 (1931); New York, N. Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT (1920) § 481; Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 12 §§ 781, 782; Texas, TEx. Rv. CV. STAT.
(Vernon, 1936) Art. 5072; England, JuDcMENTs ACT (1838), 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110.
5. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Omaha Electric Light & Power Co., 157 Fed. 514 (C. C.
A 8th, 1907); Hagan v. Commissioner's Court, 160 Ala. 544, 49 So. 417 (1909); Arizona
Eastern R. R. v. Head, 26 Ariz. 259, 224 Pac. 1057 (1924); Sayles v. Commissioner, 286
Mass. 102, 189 N. E. 579 (1934); Marion v. City of Detroit, 284 Mich. 476, 280 N. W.
26 (1938); Town of Hartland v. Damon's Estate, 103 Vt. 519, 156 At]. 518 (1931).
6. Watson v. McManus, 223 Pa. 583, 72 At. 1066 (1909). The example of a judgment
recovered in tort bearing interest illustrates this. Klock v. Robinson, 22 Wend. 157
(N. Y. 1839).
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in the present case, in distinguishing between the action for the principal sum of the
judgment and that for the interest thereon, seems to be exhibiting the reluctance of
an earlier day to extend the scope of recovery of interest. Although the amount of
the judgment had been paid and the present action was brought to recover the interest alone, still the argument of the present decision, if carried to its logical conclusion, would apply with equal force to actions brought to recover both principal
and interest accrued on a prior judgment. In such a case the anomalous situation
would be presented of allowing a plaintiff recovery within the Statute of Limitations
for the principal sum of the judgment and barring interest as an integral part of hi;
damages.
This court's distinction also seems to disregard the true nature of interest. Interest, of its nature, cannot exist alone; it is incident to the principal sum. An action
brought to recover any sum bearing interest is usually conceived of as being a
single, inseparable action.7 It is, in cases like the present, where the principal sum
has already been satisfied, that a separate action for the interest is brought.8 Mhile
it is true that some courts regard interest upon judgments as damages for the nonpayment of the sum of the judgment,9 still interest has been held, in well considered opinions, to be part of the judgment and incident to it.10 Interest has been
held to be as distinctly a substantive part of the judgment debt, as if the obligation
to pay it were founded on a contract therefor. 1 x In the famous case of Foa:cs v.
Beer' 2 an agreement to release the judgment debtor from his obligation to pay interest on the judgment was held invalid because of failure of consideration, since the
debtor was already under obligation to pay the interest as an integral part of the
original judgment debt. The payment of the principal sum has been held not to
be a satisfaction of the judgment debt in subsequent actions brought to recover
the interest due upon the judgment. 13 If the interest is an inseparable part of the
7. "Where the terms of an obligation comprehend interest, it is inaccurate to say interest is added by way of damages, for it is a substantive part of the debt as much as the
principal is." Hummel v. Brown, 24 Pa. 310 (1855). It has been held that interest is a
legal incident of every judgment when a statute provides that judgment shall bear interest.
Cochran v. Cummings, 4 Dall. 250 (Pa. 1802); Commonwealth v. Vanderlice, 8 S. & R.
452 (Pa. 1822). That interest is as much part of the judgment lien as the principal am
recovered when a statute provides for its collection on execution has been held in Mower
v. Kip, 2 Edw. Ch. 165 (N. Y. 1834) and Sims v. Campbell, 1 McCord Eq. 53, 16 Am.
Dec. 595 (S. C. 1826). See also 2 F.sz~rAN, Jt o.,'irs (5th cd. 1925) 1954.
8. As where the principal sum due on a negotiable instrument was paid, and an action
to recover the interest due upon the instrument was allowed. Florence v. Jenlng5, 2
C. B. N. S. 454 (1857).
9. See cases cited in note 5, supra.
10. National Bank v. Mechanics Bank, 94 U. S. 437 (1876). The opinion in this case
discusses the history of interest. It is cited with approval in Ticonic Nat. Bank v. Sprague,
303 U. S. 406 (1938). See also Cochran v. Cummings, 4 Dall. 250 (Pa. 1S02), and Commonwealth v. Vanderslice, 8 S. & R. 452 (Pa. 1822).
11. Watson v. McManus, 223 Pa. 583, 72 AUt. 1066 (1909), and Hummel v. Brown, 24
Pa. 310 (1855).
12. 9 A. C. 605 (1884).
13. Except where a valid release is given, or there is a lawful agreement otherwUe
providing, a judgment may be satisfied or discharged only by payment in full with accrued
interest and costs. Persons v. Gardner, 122 App. Div. 167, 106 N. Y. Supp. 616 (4th Dep't
1907). See also 2 FREEM", JuDixzNTS (5th ed. 1925) 2329.
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judgment debt-and the authorities already cited conceive of it as such-then it follows that the recovery of interest is limited in-all respects by the limitations imposed
upon actions upon judgments and those limitations only.
The instant decision holds that when judgment was entered no interest was due
and consequently interest was no part of the judgment. It is obvious that at the time
judgment is entered it is not within the court's knowledge as to when the judgment
will be satisfied. It is this impossibility of computing what interest will have accrued
of the interest in the original judgment and not any rule
that prevents the entering
14
of substantive law.
In its opinion the court makes the statement, "How the interest could afterward
modify the judgment by increasing it in amount is not suggested. . . .A judgment
stands in amount as it is entered, and the only way in which it may be modified is
by a direct proceeding for that purpose. . . . The conclusion is inescapable that
interest on a judgment is not part of it."I5 In this argument the court fails to see
that if the interest is part of the judgment then its addition cannot modify it.10 To
support its argument the court assumes the conclusion of it, namely that interest is
not part of the judgment, as a basic premise. The accruing of interest upon the
sum of a judgment is rather a legal effect provided for by statute.
The court seems to have adopted the distinction of an early case,11 that interest
is allowed not as interest, but as damages for the detention of money. This is a distinction which should make no difference in the result.' 8 Interest is admittedly recoverable as damages, but it is an element of damage inseparable from the judgment. If the judgment creditor is entitled to recover the sum of his judgment
within the time specified by the legislature, surely he is entitled to recover the damage
which is a legal incident of the judgment. If his action is not barred, certainly hs
damages should not be.19
Considering the contemporary view of interest taken, not only by laymen gener14. When the amount of costs, to give an analogy, are subsequently inserted In a blank
in the judgment and docket entry left for that purpose, it is covered by the judgment
lien, provided of course this practice is permitted by statute. Matthewson v. Fredrich,
19 S. D. 423, 103 N. W. 656 (1905). Costs of appeal have been held to be in contemplation of law a part of the original judgment appealed from. McClung v. Belrne, 10 Leigh
394, 34 Am. Dec. 739 (Va. 1839).
15. See Blakeslee's Storage Warehouses, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill. 480, 484,
17 N. E. (2d) 1, 3.
16. In proceedings to modify judgments the basis for modification is generally mistake
-- clerical errors in entering the judgment or mathematical errors in computing the sum
of judgment.
17. Young's Adm'r v. Lancaster, 21 Ky. 381 (1827).
18. See 2 FatR_.
, JUDOMMTs (5th ed. 1925) 2262. Although some courts allowed
interest to be recovered as interest and others as damages distinguished from Interest In
most cases both computed it by the interest allowed in actions of debt.
19. In a New York case, Matter of Sanford, 95 Misc. 3, 160 N. Y. Supp. 209 (Surr. Ct.
1916), a judgment creditor was allowed to recover in an action brought upon a prior
judgment three years after the statutory period of limitation on actions on judgments had
elapsed, because of an agreement to forbear from the collection of the judgment until
the death of a certain person. Interest for the entire period was allowed by the court.
It is obvious that the court looked upon the interest as an incident to the judgment and
as compensation to the creditor for the loss suffered by him in forbearing to collect his
judgment.

1939]

RECENT DECISIONS

ally, but even by the courts, the decision in the present case has the appearance
of an anachronism, the scope of which it is hoped will b- narrowed rather than
extended.

MiAPRL.GE-INSA.nzYy-ADJuDiCArIoN.-This action was brought in 1936 to annul
a marriage between plaintiff's incompetent son and the defendant. The incompetent
was adjudicated a lunatic in 1922, and the plaintiff, his mother, was appointed and
continued to act as committee of his person and estate. Uwile on parole from the
State Hospital, in 1926, the incompetent and the defendant were married. At the
trial, the defendant introduced evidence as to the sanity of her husband at the time
of the marriage ceremony and the court found that he understood the nature and
quality of his acts. On appeal from a judgment dismissing complaint, held, a judicially declared lunatic is not incapable of contracting marriage; the marriage was not
absolutely void and the finding of sanity was warranted by the evidence. TIeinberg
v. Weinberg, 255 App. Div. 366, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 341 (4th Dept., 1938).
The ancient doctrine, that a man shall not be allowed to stultify himself by
alleging mental incapacity in avoidance of his contracts, is no longer accepted in
the law of England or of this country.' According to the view now commonly held,
the contracts of a lunatic made before his incompetency has been judicially declared,
are voidable. 2 Where, however, a person is adjudicated insane and a committee
appointed for him, all contracts made by him concerning his estate during the life
3
of the inquisition are absolutely void; and this is so notwithstanding the fact that
4
the contract was made in a lucid interval. Although this rule is followed in a
3
majority of jurisdictions, there is conflict as to the basis for iL Some take the
view that the mere adjudication renders the acts of the incompetent void, regardless
0
of the appointment of a guardian. Such a holding would give to the decree of the
1. 2 BL. Coif-.r. *291 (Cooley 4th ed. 1899).
2. Smith v. Ryan, 191 N. Y. 452, 84 N. E. 402 (1908); Blinn v. Schwartz, 177 N. Y.
252, 69 N. E. 402 (1904); Williams v. Sapieha, 94 Tex. 430, 61 S. W. 115 (1901); 1 VInCo.--T crs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 251.
Lisoo,
3. Carter v. Beckwith, 128 N. Y. 312, 28 N. E. 82 (1891); L'Amorcaux v. Crozby,
2 Paige 422 (N. Y. 1831); Leonard v. Leonard, 31 Mass. 2S0 (I833); See Thorpe v.
Hanscom, 64 Minn. 201, 66 N. W. 1 (1896).
At common law, it was the custom to permit the jury to determine how long the lunacy
had existed and, as to contracts made during the retrospective period, the finding of insanity
was prima fade evidence of incapacity. Hughes v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. 446
(1889). Banker v. Banker, 63 N. Y. 409 (1875); Portsmouth v. Portsmouth, 1 Hagg.
Eccl. 355, 162 Eng. Reprints 611 (1828). Under the present statute in New York, N. Y.
Crv. PRAc. AcT (1920) § 1371, the inquiry is limited and confined to the fact of lunacy
at the time of the inquiry. Boschen v. Stockwell, 224 N. Y. 356, 120 N. E. 723 (1918).
4. Acacia Mlut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jago, 280 Alich. 360, 273 N. W. 599 (1937); Rannell
v. Gerner, 80 Mlo. 474, (1883). The court will not inquire whether in fact the lunacy
continued and existed at the time the contract was made. Carter v. Beckwith, 128 N. Y.
312, 28 N. E. 582 (1891).
5. The minority rule is that the adjudication and guardianship are not conclusive of
incapacity to dispose of property, but merely evidence thereof. Chase v. Spence, 150 MIich.
99, 113 N. W. 578 (1907); Field v. Lucas, 21 Ga. 447 (1857); Arrington v. Short, 10
N. C. 71 (1824).
6. "The adjudication of lunacy renders contracts thereafter entered into by the lunatic
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court a conclusive presumption of continued insanity and seems unreasonable. 7 The
better view, however, is that the appointment of the guardian works a change in
the legal power of the lunatic to act for himself.8 The committee is vested with
the control over the property of the incompetent and the latter, although not divested
of the title, can no longer buy, sell or enter into any contract binding himself or
his estate. 9 To hold otherwise would be to defeat the very purpose of the guardianship.' 0
Marriage, although primarily a status or relation, is entered into through the doors
Since there can be no
of a contract not entirely dissimilar to other contracts."
marriage without the mutual consent of both parties, there can be none where one
of the parties is mentally incapable of giving the matrimonial consent. Hence courts,
when unfettered by statute, generally follow the common law rule that the marriage
12
By statute, however, a
of a lunatic is void, on principles of ordinary contracts.
majority of jurisdictions, including New York, now holds such a marriage voidable
13
only.
The instant case raises the question as to the effect of an adjudication and guardianship upon this contract. England, by statute, holds such a marriage absolutely
void.' 4 Other jurisdictions have held that the general effect of the finding of insanity
does not apply in the case of matrimony and that the presumption of incapacity is
rebuttable.' 5 Such a conclusion has been reached despite statutes declaring all coninvalid regardless of the fact whether he has a guardian or not." Kichne v. Wessell, 53
Mo. App. 667, 671 (1893); Redden v. Baker, 86 Ind. 191, 194 (1882).
7. This would be contrary to the rule of law that the presumption of continuance
arising from a condition, once shown to exist, may be overcome by evidence to the contrary. S WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2530. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiswell, 56
Kan. 765, 44 Pac. 996 (1896). The fact that a petition for adjudication of insanity Is
denied does not render the presumption of sanity conclusive. Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray
279, 285 (Mass. 1856).
8. 1 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 257. "And then the party becomes
incapable of contracting, not merely from the state of his mind, but because the power
of present control over his property is taken from him." Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray 279,
286 (Mass. 1856); Southern Tier Masonic Relief Ass'n v. Laudenbach, 5 N. Y. Supp.
901 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
9. See Viets v. Union Nat'l Bank of Troy, 101 N. Y. 563, 569, 5 N. E. 457, 459 (1886);
People ex rel. Smith v. Commissioners, 100 N. Y. 215, 218, 3 N. E. 85, 87 (1885)
Wadsworth v. Sharpsteen, et ano., 8 N. Y. 388 (1853).
10. Jordan v. Dickson, 19 Weekly L. B. 64 (Ohio 1887).
11. BisnoP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATIONS (1891) § 296; N. Y. DoM. REL.
LAW (1909) § 10.
12. Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N. Y. 1820); Powell v. Powell, 18
Kan. 371 (1877); Rawdon v. Rawdon, 28 Ala. 565 (1856); Although no decree of nullity
is necessary, yet as well for the sake of the good order of society, as for the peace of
mind of all persons concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. 2 KENT COMM. *76.
13. N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW (1909) § 7; Dunphy v. Dunphy, 161 Cal. 87, 118 Pac.
445 (1911) ; Henderson v. Ressor, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S. W. 175 (1915) (construing Arkansas
Statute). In New York, at common law, the sane spouse could not annul the marriage.
Hoadley v. Hoadley, 244 N. Y. 424, 155 N. E. 728 (1927). By recent amendment, however, this disability has been removed. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT (1932) § 1137.
14. 15 GEO. II, c. 30; 19 HALSBuRy's LAWS OF ENGLAND 822.
15. Castor v. Davis, 120 Ind. 231, 22 N. E. 110 (1889); McClearly v. Barcalow, 3
Ohio C. C. 481 (1891). 2 BIsHoP, MARRIAGE, DlvORCE AND SEPARATION (1891) § 1243.
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tracts of adjudicated lunatics void.' 6 This rule seems quite a proper departure from
the rule holding the ordinary contract of the incompetent to be an absolute nullity.
The latter rule is practical and efficient, since the lunatic has someone to act for
him.' 7 However, inasmuch as marriage involves a personal relation of love and
affection, it is readily seen that the guardian cannot act for the one who is supposed
to experience that emotion and make a decision in his stead on a helpmate. He
cannot become an alter ego, even by judicial appointment. The courts of New York,
prior to the instant case, have not passed on this point, although the propriety of the
foreign decisions has been recognized.' 8 The result in the principal case follows the
general trend of this and other jurisdictions, in refusing to give effect to the conclusive presumption of incapacity of a lunatic under guardianship, as to acts which
are purely personal and which the guardian cannot perform.
1
This trend is apparent in analogous situations. In Wormington v. Wormington, 5
a Missouri Court held that a reconciliation, after separation, between a husband and
wife, the former having been previously adjudicated insane and placed under guardianship, was binding, provided the husband understood the nature of his act. The court
stated that if there had been a divorce and subsequent remarriage, the sanity at the
time of the ceremony would be a question of fact and further that the guardian
could no more condone or forgive the past than he could marry or make a will for
his ward. A will made by an adjudicated lunatic under guardianship is valid if executed in a lucid interval.2" ° Although a will is not a contract, the courts reason on
the theory that the act is one which the guardian cannot perform. An adjudicated
lunatic is a competent juror provided it can be shown that he was sane at the trial. 2"
However much the decision may be in accord with legal trends it yet may be
asked if its policy is sound. We should be eager to apply every legitimate presumption in favor of the validity of a marriage. But might we not doubt whether a person
found to be insane and incapable of managing his property would be able to assume
the duties coincident with marriage. The dependence of children renders it necessary
16. Payne v. Burdette, 84 Mo. App. 332 (1900); Roether v. Roether, 1ED Wis. 24, 191
N. W. 576 (1923); Ross v. Ross, 175 Okla. 633, 54 P. (2d) 611 (1936); Contra: Sims
v. Sims, 121 N. C. 297, 28 S. E. 407 (1897).
17. Without this rule it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the guardian to
execute his trust, since in every action concerning the property of his ward he might he
obliged to go before a jury upon the question of the ward's insanity. Thorpe v. Hanscom,
64 Minn. 201, 205, 66 N. W. 1, 2 (1896).
18. See Martello v. Cagliastro, 122 Misc. 306, 303, 202 N. Y. Supp. 703, 705 (Sup.
Ct. 1924). Contra: O'Reilly v. Sweeney, 54 Misc. 40S, 105 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (Sup. Ct.
1907), wherein the court held, in an action for damages for breach of promise of an
adjudicated lunatic to marry, that the contract was absolutely void. It should be noted
that this case primarily involved the property of the estate.
Where a widow is given by a will an election to demand dower or to accept provisions
of the will, the committee has no power to exercise such election in her behalf. Camardella
v. Schwartz, 126 App. Div. 334, 110 N. Y. Supp. 611 (2d Dept. 1903). See Matter of
Rasmussen, 147 Misc. 564, 264 N. Y. Supp. 6C0 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
19. 226 Mo. App. 195, 47 S. W. (2d) 172 (1931), wherein the plaintiff wife sought
to share in the estate of her deceased husband despite the fact that she had by separation
agreement released all claim against it.
20. Breed v. Pratt, 18 Pick 115 (Mass. 1336); 1 J,% z , Wnx.s (5th ed. 1893) 49. See
also Lewis v. Jones, 50 Barb. 645 (N. Y. 1863). In such cases the person a.centing the
validity of the will has the burden of proving sanity at the time of e-xecution.
21. State v. Bucy, 104 Mont. 416, 66 P. (2d) 1049 (1937).
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that they be maintained 22 and advised as their characters develop. By nature this
2
duty devolves upon the parent as the most fit and proper person. 3 For the duty
lucid
intervals are
whose
lunatic
an
adjudicated
a
child,
advising
and
educating
of
irregular would hardly be a fit and proper person. However, bearing in mind that
this action is to annul an executed marriage and not merely to separate the parties
or secure proper guardianship for the children we think it proper to conclude that
the decision is sound. A valid marriage exists when the intent to enter a marriage
contract is present in the parties' minds. That intent in this situation will probably
not be realized .as far as the education of offspring is concerned. This is true of
the present situation as well as the case where a person affected with a serious ailment that will probably cause death within a few months marries. But the remedy
is not to invalidate the contract, it is to protect the children and the wife by
guardianship or separation.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE-COUNTERCLAIM-STOCKHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE ACTION.--

The plaintiff corporation sued defendant, a stockholder and officer for moneys
claimed to be due it because of excess withdrawals in anticipation of extra salary,
profits and credits. The defendant counterclaims against the plaintiff and its directors
alleging mismanagement of corporate affairs and asking an accounting, the restitution of moneys improperly received by said directors, and the payment to defendant
of his share of the corporate income misappropriated. The lower court struck out
the counterclaim, holding it unavailable to the defendant on the ground that the
proceeds to be realized as a result thereof belonged to the corporation and not to
the defendant stockholder. On appeal to the Appellate Division, held, the counterclaim was proper under Section 266 of the Civil Practice Act. Order reversed.
Geer Jr. & Co. v. Fagin, 255 App. Div. 253 (3d Dep't 1938).
The recent trend toward the liberalization of procedure' is particularly illustrated
in the pleading of counterclaims. 2 Prior to 1936, the counterclaim had to meet
8
certain prescribed requisites in order to be available. It had to tend to defeat or
5
diminish the plaintiff's recovery.4 Contract could be pleaded against contract, but
22. The committee may provide for the support of the family of the lunatic, N. Y.
Civ. PRAc. AcT (1920) § 1357.
23. 2 KENT. Comm. *189; 1 BL. Comm. *447.
1. For a review of the recent modifications in pleading, see Saxe, The Renascence of
Civil Practice in New York, (1938) 7 FoRwmam L. REv. 45.
2. N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 324, amending N. Y. Civ. PaAc. AcT, §§ 245 (a), 267, 278, adding new § 266.
3. The former § 266 read as follows: "A counterclaim except as otherwise provided
by statute, must tend to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery, and must be one of
the following causes of action against the person whom he represents, and in favor of the
defendant, or of one or more defendants, between whom and the plaintiff or the plaintiff
and another person or person alleged to be liable a separate judgment may be had in the
action:
"1. A cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim or connected with the subject of the action;
"2. In an action on contract, any other cause of action on contract existing at the
commencement of the action."
4. Lipman v. Jackson, 128 N. Y. 58, 27 N. E. 975 (1891). This requirement has been
adopted by many states even in the absence of express statutory provisions. Bannerot v.
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not tort against tort, nor contract against tort unless they arose out of the same

transaction or were connected with the same subject of action. 0 Finally, the counterclaim had to be in favor of the defendant, or one or more defendants between whom
and the plaintiff, or the plaintiff and another person or persons alleged to be liable,'
a separate judgment could be had in the action.8 Vague and indefinite as were these
requirements to start with, subsequent judicial interpretations created subtle and
arbitrary distinctions. 9 The frequency with which the courts rejected causes of
action conveniently counterclaimed,10 accomplished the restoration of rigid common
law pleading. The judicial defeat of the primary purpose of a counterclaim," rendered its statutory revision urgent.
The new statute of 1936 was broad in its scope. It requires a counterclaim to be
"any cause of action in favor of the defendants or some of them against the plaintiffs

McClure, 39 Colo. 473, 90 Pac. 70 (1907); Dietrich v. Koch, 35 Wis. 618 (1874).

Clark
and Surbeck, Pleadingof Counterclaims, (1928) 37 YArx L. J.300, 310.
S. Provided the counterclaim exists at the commencement of the action. § 266 (2),
note 3, supra. Hull v. Hull, 225 N. Y. 342, 122 N. E. 252 (1919).
6. The terms "connected with the same subject of action" and "arising out of the same
transaction" proved exceedingly burdensome. The former clause has been defined as follows: "A 'subject' is that on which any operation, either mental or material, is performed;
as, a subject for contemplation or controversy. The subject of an action is either property (as illustrated by a real action) or a violated right." Glen & Hall Mfg. Co. v. Hall,
61 N. Y. 226, 236 (1874). Instances of the confusion arising out of the latter are seen
in the following cases. In Goelet v. Goldstein, 229 App. Div. 456, 242 N. M. Supp. 586
(1st Dep't 1930), an action for rent, a counterclaim alleging damage to the defendant
resulting from plaintiff's negligence in maintaining the building was sustained. But in
Zysman v. One Hundred Forty Seven-One Hundred Forty Nine West 57th Street Corp.,
221 App. Div. 84, 223 N. Y. Supp. 62 (1st Dep't 1927), an action by tenant to recover
damages for unlawful eviction, the landlord could not plead a counterclaim based on a
breach of lease by the plaintiff. See also Hopkins v. Lane, 87 N. Y. 501 (1832); Burnms
v. Lopez, 256 N. Y. 123, 175 N. E. 537 (1931); Ludlow v. McCarthy, S App. Div. S17,
38 N. Y. Supp. 1075 (2d Dep't 1896); Bernheimer v. Hartmayer, 50 App. Div. 316, 63
N. Y. Supp. 978 (1st Dep't 1900); Hunter v. Booth, 84 App. Div. 585, 82 N. Y. Supp.
1000 (2d Dep't 1903); Fleming v. Jackson, 222 App. Div. 296, 226 N. Y. Supp. 281 (Ict
Dep't 1928).
7. N. Y. CrL PRACICE Acr (1936) § 271 permitted the summoning of new parties
set up in the counterclaim. See Williams v. Tompkins, 208 App. Div. 574, 204 N. Y.
Supp. 168 (1st Dep't 1924).
8. Counterclaims under the contract clause were permitted only where the demand
affected the same rights between the parties as existed in the original action, i.e. between
the same parties in the same capacity. Hopkins v. Lane, 87 N. Y. 501 (1832); Hunter
v. Booth, 84 App. Div. 585, 82 N. Y. Supp. 1000 (2d Dep't 1903). As to pou.ible exceptions in "equitable set-offs", see Ecorse Trans. Co. v. Earhart, 96 Fed. 975 (C. C. D. Minn.
1899); Alpaugh v. Battles, 235 App. Div. 321, 257 N. Y. Supp. 126 (1st Dep't 1932).
9. See notes 6 and 8, supra.
10. Stafford v. Kremer, 258 N. Y. 1, 179 N. E. 82 (1931). Where the relief sought
by the plaintiff is not affected by the defendant's counterclaim, the counterclaim vill be
rejected. See 3 CA0roD's Naw YoRn PRAcriCE (2d ed. 1930) 2103. Also Snyder v.
Mlagnolia Metal Co., 58 App. Div. 236, 68 N. Y. Supp. 809 (1st Dep't 1901).
11. 2 JUICIAL CotrhxcI

REP. (1936)

123 states: "The counterclaim has the dual pur-

pose of (a) the satisfaction of cross-demands, and (b) the avoidance of multiplicity of
suits?'
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or some of them, a person whom the plaintiff represents, or a plaintiff and another
person or persons alleged to be liable."' 2 Also, judicial discretion has replaced the
former statutory limitations, its sole confines being convenience and justice.18 In a
recent case, the court pointed out that the legislature intended to permit parties to
an action to litigate, between themselves, any and all claims which they may possess
or acquire against each other up to the time of the trial.14 Under this liberal interpretation, a cause of action acquired by the defendant after the commencement of
the action' 5 solely for the purpose of pleading it as a counterclaim, was permitted
to be used as such. In an action for an accounting of a law partnership, counterclaims by the defendant arising out of a partnership between the plaintiff and the
defendant outside of the scope of the law partnership were sustained. 10 The litigious
terms, "arising out of the same transaction" and "connected with the same subject
of action" no longer perplex the practitioner.' 7 And, although the issue has not as
yet experienced exhaustive judicial discussion, the set-off of debts accruing in different rights appears permissible1s However, the court may, whenever it deems
proper in the interest of justice, strike out the counterclaim.19
How this new liberality will affect the pleading of counterclaims in stockholder's
representative actions, such as arises in the instant case, is an interesting inquiry.
In Security Trust Co. of Rochester v. Pritchard,20 a stockholder brought suit against

a director, and joined the corporation as a necessary party defendant. The director
counterclaimed with a derivative suit in his own name against the original plaintiff.
The counterclaim was disallowed on the ground that it did not "tend to diminish
or defeat the plaintiff's recovery" as required by statute. 2 ' In its decision the court
stressed the fact that both suits were really instigated for the purpose of restoring
corporate assets.
It might be argued that the result of this case should have been reached In the
principal case, even though the new Section 266 is apparently much more liberal.
It could be emphasized that the stockholder who brings a derivative action isnot
the true plaintiff. He is permitted to sue in this manner simply to set in motion
the judicial machinery of the court. The right of action belongs to the corporate
22
body and not to the plaintiff individually nor to the stockholders collectively.
12. The new § 266 apparently has been modeled after the English statute governing
counterclaims, which has been held to allow many counterclaims beyond the scope of those
provided for in the American Codes. See TiA ANNUAL PRACTIce (1939) Order 19, rule 3;
see Clark and Surbeck, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 302.
13. § 262 as amended by the Laws of 1936 permits the court, in its discretion, whenever the interests of justice require, to order a severance of the action or separate trials,
or strike out the counterclaim. A similar statute also exists under the English Code.
See THm ANzNUA PRAcrux (1939) Order 21, rule 15.
14. Bricken Construction Corporation v. Cushman, 163 Misc. 371, 297 N. Y. Supp.
194 (Sup. Ct. 1937).

15. See note 5, supra.
16.

Kugel v. Telsey, 250 App. Div. 638, 295 N. Y. Supp. 148 (2d Dep't 1937).

17. See note 6, supra.
18. See note 8, supra.
19. In Ritter v. Mountain Camp Holding Corp., 252 App. Div. 602, 299 N. Y. Supp.

876 (1st Dep't 1937), the counterclaim was disallowed on equitable grounds.
20.

122 Misc. 760, 204 N. Y. Supp. 31 (Sup. Ct. 1924).

21. Former § 266. See note 4, upra.
22. Brock v. Poor, 216 N. Y. 387, 111 N. E. 329 (1915); Stein v. Fruend, 219 App.
Div. 149, 213 N. Y. Supp. 9 (1st Dep't 1925); Potter v. Walker, 252 App. Div. 244, 293
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Here, a shareholder being sued by a corporation has been permitted to counterclaim
a cause of action which the corporation possesses as against the directors. It might
be said that it raises no issues as between the plaintiffs and the defendants,rs and
that it is not a counterclaim as defined in Section 266 of the Civil Practice Act.
On the other hand, a stockholder is the owner of a chose in action which has great
value or small value in proportion as the corporate assets are large or small. He
has a potential property right in any sums which may be returned to the corporation
in the event that the directors make restitution. Thus, much is to be said on both
sides of the question and we rdust await a decision of the Court of Appeals before
we shall know definitely whether liberality of counterclaim shall continue permissible
to the nth degree.

STATUTORY NEGLIGENCE--OWNER OF TRAu.---A semitrailer owned by the Niagara
Freight Lines Inc. was being hauled by a truck owned by one Walker and operated
by his employee. Through the negligence of this driver a collision with an automobile owned by William Hennessy occurred. On appeal from a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff against the owners of the truck and the semitrailer, held, two judges
dissenting, the owner of a semitrailer attached to a separately owned tractor is not
liable as a matter of law for the negligent operation of the tractor under the N. Y.
Vehicle and Traffic Law (1934) Sec. 59. A new trial must be had to discover whether
Walker, the owner of the truck, was an independent contractor. H!ennessy v. Walper,

279 N. Y. 94, 17 N. E. (2d) 782 (1938).
At common law, the owner of an automobile was not liable for the negligence of
the driver when the driver was using the car on his own business and was only a
bailee of the car.' However, this common law rule was altered by statute2 so that
today in many states the owner of a motor vehicle is made liable for injuries resultN. Y. Supp. 161 (1st Dep't 1937); Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie Nat. Sec. Corp.,
154 Misc. 615, 276 N. Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
23. Mortgage Commission v. Hill, 166 Misc. 794, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 543 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
1. Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431, 116 N. E. 78 (1917); Van Blaricon v. Dedgaon,
220 N. Y- 111, 115 N. E. 443 (1917); Fallon v. Swackhammer, 226 N. Y. 444, 123 N. E.
737 (1919). In contrast with these cases compare the Family-Car doctrine, which holds
that the owner of a car is liable for damages while a member of the family is driving it
on his own business. See Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the Family Auaom obile, (1923)
26 AlCH. L. R.v. 846. For a good brief discussion of this doctrine, see Hafsrm, Tos
(1933) 620, 621.
The common law even asserted that the negligence of the driver was not imputable to
the owner so as to preclude him from bringing an action against the negligent driver for
injuries to the car. See U-Drive-It-Car Co. Inc. v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 14 La. App. 524,
129 So. 565 (1930); Robinson v. Warrn. 129 Me-. 172, 151 At. 10 (1930); Fizher v.
International Ry., 112 Misc. 212, 182 N. Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
2. N. Y. VHIcLE AND TRA--mc Iw% (1929) § 59 provides in part: "Every owner of
a motor vehicle or motor cycle operated upon a public highway -hall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to a person or property resulting from the nligence in
the operation of such motor vehicle . . . in the business of such owner or oth-rw,:e, by
any person legally using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied,
of such owner." For similar statutes in other states see CAL. CIv. CoDo (Deering, 1935)
§ 1714%/; IOWA CODE (1935) § 5026; R. I. PuB. LAws (1927) C. 1040 § 3.
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ing from negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle by any one using it with
3
the owner's permission
In the principal case the question arises as to whether it was the intention of the
4
N. Y. legislature when it passed its own statute of this type to include a semitrailer
hauled by a truck in the class of "motor vehicle," and make its owner liable as a
matter of law for the negligence of the driver.
In the passage of such a statute, making so radical a change in a common law
rule of liability it is presumed that a legislature will make its intent and purposes
0
clear 5 and go no further than the mischief to be remedied requires. Hence, it might
seem that unless semitrailers are clearly covered they ought not to be included by
construction in the classification of the statute. When the New York act was first
passed in 1924, transporting goods by means of trailer and truck could be said, for
7
practical purposes, to be in its infancy and quite unimportant. It is at least questrailers when they
include
to
legislature
the
of
the
intention
was
it
tionable whether
passed the act.
1°
separate and
Trailers s and semitrailersg are defined and classified as vehicles
3. Tigue Sales Co. v. Reliance Motor Co., 207 Iowa 567, 221 N. W. 514 (1928). The
statute has been construed by the New York Court of Appeals to make the driver the
servant or agent of the owner. In this regard, see Psota v. Long Island R. R., 246 N. Y.
388, 159 N. E. 180 (1927). It has also been held in New York on the principle of agency
that when the driver exceeds the scope of his authority the owner is not liable. Chalka
v. Vandenburg, 252 N. Y. 101, 169 N. E. 103 (1929); Psota v. Long Island R. R., supra,
4. N. Y. VEHICLe AND TRAmc LAW (1929) § 59. Judge Tompkins, in Plaumbo v.
Ryan, 213 App. Div. 517, 210 N. Y. Supp. 225 (2d Dep't 1925), said: "The legislature by
enactment of this law abrogated the rule asserted by the Court of Appeals in the case of
Rolfe v. Hewitt, 227 N. Y. 486, 125 N. E. 804 (1920) and made the owners of automobiles
liable for the negligence of any person operating the car with the permission of the owner
whether the automobile was being used in the business of the owner or otherwise. The intent
of the legislature was to make the owner liable for the negligence of any person to whom
he might give permission to operate the car and thereby prevent an owner from escaping
liability by saying that his car was being used without his authority and not in his
business." See also, Fluegel v. Coudert, 244 N. Y. 393, 155 N. E. 683 (1927); Jackson
v. Brown & Kleinhenz, Inc., 273 N. Y. 365, 7 N. E. (2d) 265 (1937); Cohen v. Neustadter,
247 N. Y. 207, 160 N. E. 12 (1928).
5. See Seligman v. Friedlander, 199 N. Y. 373, 376, 92 N. E. 1047, 1049 (1910).
6. Psota v. Long Island R. R., 246 N. Y. 388, 159 N. E. 180 (1927).
7. HIGHWAY LAW (1924) § 282e. One must also take into consideration the fact that
§ 2 (27) of the N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAF'IC LAW which defines trailers was not added
until 1932, L. 1932, c. 338, § 1; § 2 (28) of the N. Y. act which defines semitrailers was
not added until 1934, L. 1934, c. 471, § 1.
8. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIc LAW (1929) § 2 (27) which reads, "Trailer shall include
any vehicle not propelled by its own power drawn on the public highways by a motor
vehicle operated thereon except vehicles being towed by a non-rigid support and vehicles
designed and primarily used for other purposes and only occasionally drawn by a motor
vehicle."
9. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (1930) § 2 (28) reads: "Semitrailer shall include
any trailer which is so designed that when operated the forward end of its body or chassis
rests upon the body or chassis of the towing vehicle."
10. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFIo LAW (1930) § 2 (7) of the act reads: "Vehicle shall
include any device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported
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distinct from motor vehicles" under the New York law. But since they have no
motive power of their own and cannot be moved except by some outside force, they
are not motor vehicles.' 2 Now while section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law has
been amended since the time that these definitions became part of the law, no attempt
was made to enlarge the meaning of motor vehicles so as to include trailer and
semitrailer. Section 59 expressly covers only motor vehicles or motorcycles.
With reference to the claim that the trailer when it becomes attached to the truck
becomes part and parcel of the truck so that the trailer and truck may be considered as one motor vehicle, it may be asked if the mere fact that a trailer is
hitched to and drawn by a motor vehicle changes its character as a separate and
distinct vehicle? It seems not. Perhaps the reason why the minority strains its logic
in favor of considering the truck and trailer one vehicle is because it seems unjust
and unfair to allow the owner of a trailer to avoid liability by hiring an independent
contractor to haul its goods. Large corporations can carry on an extensive trucking
business over the highway and escape all responsibility for negligence even though
it employed a financially irresponsible person as an independent contractor. The
remedy, however, is not strained logic or circuitous action by courtsla but direct
action by legislators. In New York, the state legislature has entertained a bill which
make the operator of the tractor also the agent of the owner of the
would now
4
trailer.'
or drawn upon a public highway, except a baby carriage and devices used exclusively on
stationarv rails or tracks."
11. N. Y. VscLE Ai Tam c LAw (1930) § 2 (8) which in full reads: "A motor
vehicle shall include all vehicles propelled by any power other than muscular po~ver,
except motor cycles, tractor engines, road rollers, fire and police vehicle:, tractors ued
exclusively for agricultural purposes, tractor cranes, power shovels, road building machines,
snow plows, road sweepers, sand spreaders, well drillers, electric trucks with small vhcels
used in factories, warehouses, and railroad stations and operated principally on private
property, and such vehicles as run only upon rails or tracks.'
12. The exact status of the trailer when used for transportation of persons or as a
residence is beginning to trouble the courts. The trailer when detached has bcen bd
to be a house. Opinion of Federal judge R. J. McMillan, San Antonio, Texas, appearing
in the N. Y. Times, March 8, 1939, p. 16 col. 5. See (1937) 6 FonmDH t L. REv. 332.
13. The highest court of Ohio in construing a Michigan statute similar to § 59 N. Y.
Vehicle and Traffic Law said that when a trailer was attached to a tractor, it did not
become a motor vehicle. However the Ohio court said that the duties of a common carrier
are undelegable, and it is answerable for the negligence of persons to whom it entrusts
performance of part of its duties, if the acts are done in performance of such duties while
acting in the scope of the agreement for carriage. Liberty Highway Co. v. Callahan, 24
Ohio App. 374, 157 N. E. 708 (1926).
The Court of Appeals of Missouri held that a trailer attached to a semitrailer w~as a
motor vehicle within a statute prohibiting operation on highways of motor vehicles having
an excessive gross weight. State v. Schwartzman Service Inc., 225 Mo. App. S77, 40 S. W.
(2d) 479 (1931); Eddleman v. City of Brazil, 201 Ind. 84, 166 N. E. 1 (1929).
14. A. Int. 494, Pr. 506, Ehrlich, cited in N. Y. S. B. A. (cir. 46) 131.

